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The New Cybersquatters: The Evolution 
of Trademark Enforcement in the 
Domain Name Space 
Michael Karanicolas* 
The domain name space has become a particularly contentious 
area of trademark enforcement as a result of the growth of online 
commerce, an intense competition for popular domain names, and 
new conceptual challenges stemming from the borderless and  
textual nature of the medium. In response, the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), a global non-profit 
which oversees the domain-name space, has implemented a highly 
sophisticated set of rights-protection mechanisms. This Article  
examines the scope of trademark protections applied under 
ICANN’s rights protection mechanisms to demonstrate that they 
have evolved far beyond their traditional consumer protection  
function; indeed, they have morphed into offensive brand manage-
ment tools, whose application in the global domain name space 
vastly exceeds the protections that are available under domestic  
legal frameworks. The Article begins by introducing ICANN and  
its main trademark protection instruments, namely the Uniform  
Dispute Resolution Policy, the Uniform Rapid Suspension, and the 
Trademark Clearinghouse, before demonstrating the divergence  
between protections under these systems and the protections under 
domestic legal frameworks. The result is that trademark owners turn 
to ICANN for rights and remedies that would not be available from 
ordinary sovereigns, embodying a major expansion of trademark 
protections. The Article concludes by outlining the contours of  
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ongoing discussions re-examining these mechanisms, and the  
challenges in curbing this maximalist view of trademark law. 
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  INTRODUCTION  
The spread of internet access presents challenges across many 
different fields of legal theory as concepts developed for an offline 
world have had to be revised and adapted to deal with new digital 
realities. The most difficult aspects of this revolve around the bor-
derless and international nature of the internet, which can challenge 
fundamental notions of jurisdiction and sovereignty. Online speech 
exists simultaneously everywhere and nowhere, and the extra- 
territorial application of rules on issues such as privacy1 and hate 
speech2 are matters of emerging debate. Trademark law was one of 
the areas of regulation where these challenges first emerged, as  
major brands sought to assert ownership over domain names asso-
ciated with their products. These debates had a significant impact in 
shaping the modern internet governance space. Moreover, over the 
past two decades, voices calling for stronger enforcement of trade-
mark rights have been profoundly successful, not only in the  
establishment of specialized mechanisms to assert their interests,3 
but in developing an emergent area of law that has become almost 
totally unrecognizable from its traditional origins in consumer  
protection, and the prevention of confusion in commerce.4 
This Article examines the trademark protection framework that 
has developed to apply to the global domain name space, and  
contrasts that framework against the role and function of trademark 
law in order to demonstrate that current enforcement mechanisms 
have moved far beyond the traditional justification for their legal 
status. The Article demonstrates that enforcement mechanisms have  
become offensive brand management tools, whose application in the 
 
1 See, e.g., Why and How GDPR Applies to Companies Globally, PRIVACY INT’L  
(May 25, 2018), https://privacyinternational.org/feature/2207/why-and-how-gdpr-applies-
companies-globally [https://perma.cc/8EYX-2RTH]. 
2 See, e.g., Philip Oltermann, Tough New German Law Puts Tech Firms and Free 
Speech in Spotlight, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/
jan/05/tough-new-german-law-puts-tech-firms-and-free-speech-in-spotlight 
[https://perma.cc/5FT7-2FFA]. 
3 See Rights Protection Mechanisms (RPMs) & Dispute Resolutions Procedures 
(DRPs), ICANN (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/rpm-drp-2017-
10-04-en [https://perma.cc/3D2B-7EDK]. 
4 See infra Parts IV, V. 
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global domain name space vastly exceeds the protections that are 
available under domestic legal frameworks.  
Part I will describe the main international body governing the 
domain name space, ICANN, and will also address the multi- 
stakeholder process by which ICANN makes decisions. The Article 
will pay particular attention to the representation of trademark  
interests in this ecosystem. Part II will then give a basic introduction 
to trademark law, particularly as developed and applied in three 
sample jurisdictions: Canada, the United States, and the European 
Union (“EU”). Part III discusses the origins of the main trademark 
protection system in the domain name space, the Uniform Dispute  
Resolution Policy, before Part IV introduces the newer generation 
of rights protection mechanisms, in particular the Uniform Rapid 
Suspension and the Trademark Clearinghouse. The standards  
of trademark protection enforced under these systems will be  
contrasted with those established under domestic frameworks, in  
order to demonstrate the divergence. Under the evolving policy  
arbitrage, trademark owners turn to ICANN for rights and remedies 
that would not be available from ordinary sovereigns, with the result  
that the system favors larger and better-established entities over new  
entrants. Part V will go on to discuss emerging areas of enforcement, 
such as through new private-sector-led initiatives, before conclud-
ing with a discussion of what this all means for the global domain 
name space, and the avenue ahead. 
I. BACKGROUND: ICANN AND THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM 
A. ICANN 
ICANN is a non-profit corporation that oversees a number of 
critical technical functions underlying the global internet, including 
managing the generic top-level domain name system (“gTLD”) and 
the country code top-level domain name system (“ccTLD”).5 In lay 
terms, ICANN coordinates the connection between the address or 
name that people use to navigate to a website, such as “google.com” 
 
5 Welcome to ICANN!, ICANN (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/
welcome-2012-02-25-en [https://perma.cc/M8T9-2XCS]. 
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or “yale.edu,” and its location on the global network. This global 
domain name system (“DNS”) is necessary to make the internet  
accessible and usable, since while computers find places on the 
global network via a string of numbers, like “192.0.32.7,” domain 
names create a shorthand that is easy to remember and share.6 
ICANN’s role is to coordinate this global system of identifiers with 
the goal of ensuring “universal resolvability,” meaning that  
wherever you are in the world, accessing the network with the same 
query will return the same results.7 
ICANN was incorporated to carry out these functions in 1998, 
taking over management from Network Solutions Inc., a private, 
U.S.-based company.8 ICANN carried out this work under a memo-
randum of understanding from the U.S. Department of Commerce.9 
The U.S. government’s role flowed from the fact that the internet 
protocols were developed primarily by researchers in the United 
States, working under grants from the Defense Advanced Research  
Projects Agency and the National Science Foundation.10 However, 
as the internet grew and expanded, there was increasing pressure to 
“internationalize” the governance of internet identifiers in order  
to better insulate the process from partisan politics, as well as to 
safeguard against the erection of global jurisdictional barriers to the 
free flow of information.11 It is worth noting that this pressure  
emanated not only from the technical community, but also from 
business interests and civil society groups.12 As a result, between 
2014 and 2016, ICANN and the National Telecommunications  
and Information Administration (“NTIA”) carried out the “IANA 
 
6 What Does ICANN Do?, ICANN (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.icann.org/resources/
pages/what-2012-02-25-en [https://perma.cc/69FM-9SLT]. 
7 Id. 
8 See MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE 
TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 194–98 (2002). 
9 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INTERNET CORPORATION FOR 
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (1998), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/
1998/memorandum-understanding-between-us-department-commerce-and-internet-
corporat [https://perma.cc/WR8N-KYVN]. 
10 See Milton L. Mueller, Detaching Internet Governance from the State: Globalizing 
the IANA, 4 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 35 (2014). 
11 Id. at 35–36. 
12 See id. at 37. 
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Stewardship Transition,” under which the agreement between 
ICANN and the U.S. government was allowed to expire and this 
function was delegated fully and independently to ICANN.13 
1. Multi-Stakeholder Decision Making 
ICANN itself operates as a multi-stakeholder organization, with 
multiple different layers of decision-making, led by a President  
and a Board of Directors.14 However, despite the organization’s  
pretenses of inclusivity (including the fact that its three annual meet-
ings are open to the public)15 ICANN’s processes are notoriously 
difficult for outsiders to wrap their heads around.16 There are a  
number of reasons for this, including a heavy reliance on long and 
unintuitive acronyms,17 the “byzantine” structure of the organiza-
tion,18 and the highly specialized and technically sophisticated  
nature of the debates.19 
ICANN’s multi-stakeholder model includes spaces for  
engagement by governments through the Governmental Advisory 
Committee,20 engagement by civil society through the Non- 
 
13 Stewardship of IANA Functions Transitions to Global Internet Community as 
Contract with U.S. Government Ends, ICANN (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.icann.org/
news/announcement-2016-10-01-en [https://perma.cc/KG52-E8T8]. IANA stands for the 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. See id.  
14 See Insperity OrgPlus 2012, ICANN (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.icann.org/en/
system/files/files/management-org-01may18-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TRW-Z83N]. 
15 See About, ICANN PUB. MEETINGS (Nov. 8, 2019), https://meetings.icann.org/en/
about [https://perma.cc/B2PL-ACLY]. 
16 See Annemarie Bridy, Notice and Takedown in the Domain Name System: ICANN’s 
Ambivalent Drift into Online Content Regulation, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1346, 1350–51 
(2017). 
17 Acronyms are such a part of life in ICANN that the organization created a multilingual 
tool to help explain them. See ICANN Acronyms and Terms, ICANN, https://www.icann.
org/icann-acronyms-and-terms/en/nav/A [https://perma.cc/85A9-YBAL]. 
18 Bridy, supra note 16, at 1350. 
19 For example, one of ICANN’s more high-profile community-review processes, the 
Security, Stability, and Resiliency Review, has a mandate to examine “how effectively 
ICANN is meeting its commitment to enhance the operational stability, reliability, 
resiliency, security, and global interoperability of the systems/processes (internal/external) 
that affect the Internet’s unique identifiers.” Pamela Smith, SSR2 Review, ICANN (Sept. 
30, 2019), https://community.icann.org/display/SSR/SSR2+Review [https://perma.cc/
J2TN-79D3]. 
20 See Governmental Advisory Committee, ICANN GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE (Nov. 8, 2019), https://gac.icann.org/ [https://perma.cc/Z4LT-3MCY]. 
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Commercial Stakeholder Group,21 engagement by internet end users 
through the At-Large Advisory Committee,22 and engagement by 
business interests through the Commercial Stakeholders Group.23 
This last group includes the Intellectual Property Constituency 
(“IPC”), which is a constituency specifically for advancing trade-
mark and copyright protections.24 Although the IPC has been the 
main driver of proposals aimed to enhance trademark protections  
in the domain name space, it is also worth noting that the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), a United Nations 
body whose purpose is to promote the protection of intellectual 
property, has been heavily engaged at ICANN since its foundation.25 
The engagement of trademark interests generally, and WIPO in 
particular, was driven by the emerging realization that, in addition 
to providing a host of business opportunities, the internet could also 
serve as a mechanism for intellectual property infringement.26 Early 
on, WIPO emphasized that the purpose of their engagement was:  
not to create new rights in intellectual property, nor 
to accord greater protection to intellectual property 
in cyberspace than that which existed elsewhere.  
Rather, [their] goal was to give proper and adequate 
expression to the existing, multilaterally agreed 
standards of intellectual property protection in  
the context of the multi-jurisdictional medium of  
the Internet.27  
However, as the following sections demonstrate, trademark enforce-
ment in the domain name space has grown to vastly outstrip the  
 
21 See Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group, ICANN (Nov. 8, 2019), https://gnso.
icann.org/en/about/stakeholders-constituencies/ncsg [https://perma.cc/KW4Y-45X5]. 
22 See About Us, ICANN AT-LARGE, https://atlarge.icann.org/about/index 
[https://perma.cc/3L22-XZ5P]. 
23 See Commercial Stakeholder Group, ICANN, https://gnso.icann.org/en/about/
stakeholders-constituencies/csg [https://perma.cc/CT4R-FM77]. 
24 See About the IPC, ICANN INTELL. PROP. CONSTITUENCY (Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://www.ipconstituency.org/about-the-ipc [https://perma.cc/H5AF-HWWK]. 
25 See MUELLER, supra note 8, at 138, 166. 
26 Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
ORG. ¶¶ 22–23 (Apr. 30, 1999), https://wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process1/report/final
report.html [https://perma.cc/8ZDZ-8KDK]. 
27 See MUELLER, supra note 8, at 231. 
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protections that are offered even in the world’s most trademark-
friendly jurisdictions. 
II. TRADEMARK LAW AND THE DOMAIN NAME SPACE 
A. The Origin and Purpose of Trademark Law 
The basic function of a trademark is to distinguish the goods of 
one enterprise from those of another.28 Traditional scholarship on 
the purpose of trademark law, which draws heavily from law and 
economics,29 views them as a matter of consumer protection, insofar 
as they reduce consumers’ search costs in obtaining products of a 
reliable quality, while simultaneously incentivizing companies to 
invest resources in developing a product of consistent quality.30  
In short, trademarks impose a measure of accountability upon  
producers for the products they generate, allowing them to cultivate 
a reputation—for good or for ill—that accurately reflects the outputs 
that they have delivered. In this respect, trademarks are something 
of an anomaly in intellectual property law, as the Supreme Court of 
Canada noted in Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc.: 
Unlike the patent owner or the copyright owner, the 
owner of a trade-mark is not required to provide  
the public with some novel benefit in exchange for 
the monopoly. . . . The trade-mark owner . . . may 
simply have used a common name as its “mark” to 
differentiate its wares from those of its competitors. 
Its claim to monopoly rests not on conferring a  
benefit on the public in the sense of patents or copy-
rights but on serving an important public interest in 
assuring consumers that they are buying from the 
source from whom they think they are buying and  
 
28 See Trademarks, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/trademarks/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/8ZDZ-8KDK]. For the sake of simplicity, this Article will use the term 
“trademarks” to include service marks as well. 
29 Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 
(2004). 
30 Id.; see also William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987). 
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receiving the quality which they associate with that 
particular trade-mark.31 
Like other forms of intellectual property protection, trademark 
rights are limited. In crafting the level of protection to afford to 
trademark holders, policymakers must carry out a careful balancing 
“between the hardships to a competitor in hampering the use of an 
appropriate word and those to the owner who, having invested 
money and energy to endow a word with the good will adhering  
to his enterprise, would be deprived of the fruits of his efforts.”32 
Granting a monopoly to a single company over the use of a  
particular word or symbol may give them an unfair advantage over  
their competitors, particularly if it is commonly used to describe a 
particular product or category of products, or if it is generic.33 
Providing trademark protection to generic terms also undermines a 
basic function of trademark law as a result of the terms’ lack of  
inherent distinctiveness.34 For example, a restaurant that marketed 
itself under the name “Restaurant” would have difficulty distin-
guishing itself on this basis. By contrast, the strongest protections 
typically attach to fanciful words, like Exxon or Xerox.35 
B. Dilution and Tarnishment 
In contrast to the traditional theory of trademarks as a vehicle 
for consumer protection and economic efficiency, the doctrines of 
dilution or tarnishment allows owners of trademarks to take action 
against a much broader category of uses of their protected words  
or symbols.36 Unlike traditional trademark claims, actions for  
dilution or tarnishment may target infringements where there is  
no competition between the parties, if the use of the mark is likely 
to cast it in an unflattering light, cause it to be identified with  
 
31 Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 722, 788, para. 21 (Can.). 
32 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976). 
33 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., INTRODUCTION TO TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE: THE 
BASIC CONCEPTS 21 (2d ed. 1993), available at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/
wipo_pub_653.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7EH-CZNP]. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 17. 
36 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 828 (1927). 
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dissimilar goods, dilute its distinctive quality, or otherwise reduce 
its “selling power.”37 
The earliest appearance of the doctrine of dilution was in 1898, 
when an English court upheld a claim by the owner of the 
“KODAK” trademark for cameras against the use of the same  
word for the sale of bicycles.38 Although the judge in that case  
justified his decision by finding a “great . . . connection between the 
two classes of business,”39 which would lead to a likelihood of con-
fusion, the case nonetheless broke new ground insofar as it allowed 
for a trademark’s protection to carry over into an entirely new  
category of goods.40 The judge ruled against the junior user because 
allowing them to do business under the established name would 
grant an improper benefit.41 
Approaches to trademark dilution or tarnishment vary signifi-
cantly between jurisdictions. In the EU, dilution is defined as any 
instance where goods or services are marketed under a trademark 
for which an identical or similar sign is used by a third party and 
where the goods or services may be perceived by the public in  
such a way that the senior trademark’s power of attraction is  
diminished.42 This does not have to be connected to inferior  
products and may be found to have taken place when the goods or 
services being offered by the junior user possess some quality that 
is liable to have a negative impact on impressions of the mark.43  
For example, the Benelux Court of Justice found in favor of a com-
plainant Dutch gin company (Claeryn) against a liquid detergent 
maker whose product (Klarein) was pronounced identically, on the 
 
37 See id. at 818–19. 
38 Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are Confused About the Trademark Dilution Law, 
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1175, 1179, 1179 n.18 (2006). 
39 Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. John Griffiths Cycle Corp. (1898) 15 R.P.C. 
105, 110 (UK). 
40 Farley, supra note 38, at 1179. 
41 Eastman Photographic Materials Co., 15 R.P.C. at 112. 
42 Case NVC-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, I-5203, I-5246 
(Eng.). 
43 Cour de Justice Benelux [Benelux Court of Justice] Case A 74/1, Jan. 3, 1975, 
Colgate-Palmolive BV v. Koninklijke Distilleerderijen Erven Lucas Bols NV (Mar. 3, 
1975) 7 I.I.C. 420, at 472 (Claeryn v. Klarein), available at http://www.courbeneluxhof.be/
arresten/FR/A/A_74_1_379.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WYY-SLKB]. 
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basis that the similarity might cause consumers drinking the alcohol 
to think of liquid detergent.44 
In the United States, dilution is protected at the federal level  
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 199545 and the Trade-
mark Dilution Revision Act of 2006.46 The 2006 Act was passed  
to overrule a requirement, read in by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., that complainants demonstrate 
actual dilution of their brand, rather than merely the likelihood of 
dilution.47 This “judicial nullification”48 is not the only example of 
the chilly reception this concept received in American courts. In 
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Circus Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Utah Division of Travel Development, an early dilution case, the 
trial judge opined to the attorney for the trademark holder: “boy you 
must have some lobby to get a law like that passed.”49 Academic 
reception to dilution has been similarly frosty, with scholars  
claiming that dilution “provides a remedy without a supportable  
theorization of the harm,”50 that the doctrine was “undermining mar-
ket efficiency and consumer welfare,”51 and that it “should be found 
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s existing commercial-
speech jurisprudence.”52 Justice Thomas McCarthy, while not  
rejecting the principle of dilution outright, opined that it should be 
held to a very strong evidentiary standard, and only applied in  
“unusual and extraordinary cases.”53 
In Canada, even though no statute provides a basis for a claim 
of trademark dilution, section 22(1) of the Trade-marks Act does, in 
 
44 Id. 
45 Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 
1127 (2006)). 
46 Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006). 
47 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 419, 433 (2003). 
48 Farley, supra note 38, at 1178. 
49 Id. at 1177 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey 
v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 935 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Va. 1996)). 
50 Id. at 1184. 
51 Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for 
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 866 (1997). 
52 Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 561 (2008). 
53 J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark Has Been Diluted: Theories or Facts, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 713, 747 (2004). 
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effect, allow for an action for tarnishment: “No person shall use a 
trade-mark registered by another person in a manner that is likely to 
have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching 
thereto.”54 Although this provision does not require confusion, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques 
Cliquot Ltée found that some association in the mind of the  
consumer between the junior user’s product or display and the senior 
user’s mark is necessary.55 Moreover, in that case, as well as in  
the concurrently released Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc.,56  
the Supreme Court limited the special consideration offered to  
“famous” marks, with the Supreme Court quoting in Mattel, Inc. an 
earlier Federal Court of Appeal decision in Pink Panther Beauty 
Corp. v. United Artists Corp.: 
I do not see how the fame of the mark acts as a  
marketing trump card such that the other factors are 
thereby obliterated. . . . Famousness alone does not 
protect a trade-mark absolutely. It is merely a factor 
that must be weighed in connection with all the rest 
of the factors. If the fame of a name could prevent 
any other use of it, the fundamental concept of a 
trade-mark being granted in relation to certain wares 
would be rendered meaningless.57 
Indeed, in Adidas AG v. Globe International Nominees Pty Ltd., the 
Federal Court of Appeal held that Adidas’ fame actually worked 
against it in a claim against a shoe manufacturer that branded their 
wares with a two-stripe, rather than a three-stripe design, since the 
iconic nature of the Adidas logo meant that consumers would be 
likely to spot even this subtle difference.58 
 
54 Trademarks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c T-13 (Can.). 
55 Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 824, 827–28 
(Can.). 
56 See generally Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 722 (Can.). 
57 Id. at 809, 810 (quoting Pink Panther Beauty Corp. v. United Artists Corp., [1998]  
3 F.C. 534 (Can.)). 
58 Adidas AG v. Globe Int’l Nominees Pty Ltd., 2015 F.C. 443 (Can.), at 20–21, 
available at https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/109229/index.do [https://
perma.cc/CAG2-Q7A3]. 
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C. Trademark Law and the Domain Name Space 
The rise of the internet and the expansion of trademark law into 
the domain name space have brought additional legal challenges, 
particularly when combined with the burgeoning rules around  
dilution. As noted in the previous section, traditional understandings 
of trademarks were rooted in confusion, leading to their applicability 
as being limited to the specific class of product that the mark applied 
to, as well as the jurisdiction where it was being marketed.59 For 
example, no conflict arises between a company marketing Delta 
brand faucets and other “Delta” companies in different industries, 
such as Delta Airlines, Delta Bank, or Delta Hotels, since there  
is little realistic likelihood of confusion between these brands.60 
Similarly, a quick search for the “Hotel California” turns up busi-
nesses in Thailand, Nepal, India, Italy and the Philippines, none of 
which appear to be affiliated with one another (or, presumably, with 
The Eagles).61 However, while these businesses can comfortably  
co-exist in the offline world, with little possibility that any might be 
poaching customers from the others, in the online space, there can 
only be one website located at: “HotelCalifornia.com.” 
There are not, nor have there ever been, any effective  
mechanisms to resolve disputes between two entities that have  
competing legitimate claims to a domain name space, and as a result 
the traditional doctrine of “first come, first served” is still in place. 
 
59 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 33, at 38. 
60 See, e.g., DELTA FAUCET COMPANY, https://www.deltafaucet.com/ [https://perma.cc/
6TF4-DW4T]; DELTA AIR LINES, http://www.delta.com/ [https://perma.cc/29XF-6N3U]; 
About, DELTA BANK, http://en.deltabank.com.ua/ [https://perma.cc/ZAR4-XU7G]; 
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, http://deltahotels.marriott.com/ [https://perma.cc/YU5G-
3FPT]. 
61 Many of these businesses do not have their own websites, but reviews for their 
services can be found. See, e.g., Hotel California, TRIPADVISOR, http://www.tripadvisor.ca
/Hotel_Review-g293916-d3181797-Reviews-Hotel_California-Bangkok.html 
[https://perma.cc/4WFG-NLD9]; Hotel California, NEPAL BUS. DIRECTORY, 
http://www.nepalyp.com/company/42640/Hotel_California [https://perma.cc/68TV-
3UU9]; Hotel California, TRIPADVISOR, https://www.tripadvisor.ca/ShowUserReviews-
g4053412-d10672622-r436118171-Hotel_California-Ernakulam_Kochi_Cochin_
Ernakulam_District_Kerala.html [https://perma.cc/LM9P-JK2G]; Hotel California, 
TRIPADVISOR, www.tripadvisor.ca/Hotel_Review-g298461-d7185333-Reviews-Hotel_
California-Lapu_Lapu_Mactan_Island_Cebu_Island_Visayas.html [https://perma.cc/
8X37-3R54]. 
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If Finlandia vodka was quicker to register “www.finlandia.com” 
than Finlandia Cheese, there is nothing the latter can do, other than 
offer to purchase it from the vodka company, or settle for a different 
domain and hope that users will still be able to find them. 
Complicating the matter still further is the fact that the scope of 
trademark protection varies significantly across jurisdictions.  
For example, Canadian and American approaches to registering  
“offensive” trademarks differ significantly.62 In Canada, the  
Trademarks Act includes a number of explicitly prohibited classes 
of registration, including marks that are “scandalous, obscene or  
immoral.”63 By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in  
Iancu v. Brunetti invalidated provisions of the Lanham Act that  
prohibited the registration of marks which are “immoral, deceptive, 
or scandalous” on the grounds that this represents viewpoint  
discrimination.64  
Geographic indicators are another example of where there are 
wide divergences in the law.65 European trademark law recognizes 
the branding of items like “champagne,” which must be produced  
in the eponymous region of France.66 By contrast, the United States’ 
position is that this term has become generic, and it refuses to  
enforce this mark against American producers of “champagne.”67  
Legitimate uses of protected marks, including fair use, fair  
dealing, and parody, also differ substantially in their interpretation 
across jurisdictions.68 The universality of the domain name space  
inevitably leads to situations where a holder of a legitimate trade-
mark in one jurisdiction will seek to enforce rights against a party 
 
62 See generally Lauren Blaiwais & Miller Scott, Offensive Trademarks: The Canadian 
and American Perspectives, 30 INTELL. PROP. J. 205 (2018). 
63 Trademarks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c T-13, art. 9(1)(j) (Can.). 
64 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2301, 2302 (2019). 
65 See generally Demetra Makris, Geographical Indicators: A Rising International 
Trademark Dispute Between Europe’s Finest and Corporate America, 34 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 159 (2017). 
66 Directive 2008/95/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2008 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 2001 O.J. 
(L 299), art. 15(2). 
67 Deborah J. Kemp & Lynn M. Forsythe, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: 
A Case of California Champagne, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 257, 257–59 (2007). 
68 See generally Federico Fusco, The Trademark Fair Use Defense: A Comparative 
Perspective, 7 GLOBAL JURIST 1 (2007). 
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where these rights are not recognized, and where it is not easy  
for these contrasting understandings of the law to simply coexist.  
Ultimately, only one party may keep the domain name. 
III. THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT 
A. The Rise of Cybersquatting 
In the early days of the internet, a lack of awareness of the  
business opportunities that were available online, combined with the 
relatively cheap costs of registering a domain name, allowed some 
unscrupulous and forward-thinking entrepreneurs an avenue to 
profit by registering the names of famous brands before their owners 
did and selling them at a steep markup. Among the most prolific of 
these early “cybersquatters” was Dennis Toeppen, who registered 
around 250 domain names which were similar or identical to well-
known trademarks, including deltaairlines.com, eddiebauer.com, 
and yankeestadium.com.69 These sites were sometimes associated 
with a thinly veiled legitimate use, such as Panavision.com, which 
he used to host photographs of the city of Pana, Illinois.70 However, 
he would also offer to sell these websites to the brand owners at a 
steep markup.71 Although these cases were typically resolved in  
the neighborhood of $5,000 to $15,000, the market for valuable  
domain names went much higher.72 Wallstreet.com, which was  
registered for $70 in 1994,73 sold at auction for $1 million in 1999.74 
Some brand owners, including Panavision, refused to pay, instead  
choosing to file suit on the grounds of infringement or dilution.75 
 
69 THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA 455 (Hossein Bidgoli ed., 2003). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Michael Berkens, WallStreet.com Is Back for Sale with Wall-Street.com & 7 
Trademark: Starting Bid: $30M, DOMAINS (Apr. 1, 2015), https://thedomains.com/2015/
04/01/wallstreet-com-is-back-for-sale-with-wall-street-com-7-trademark-starting-bid-
30m/ [https://perma.cc/E3UQ-TGWK]. 
73 Mairead Moore, Cybersquatting: Prevention Better Than Cure?, 17 INT’L J.L. & INFO. 
TECH. 220, 222 (2008). 
74 Berkens, supra note 72. 
75 Panavision Int’l, LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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These cases were typically successful.76 In addition to findings 
of dilution, which is ultimately how Panavision v. Toeppen was  
resolved,77 courts in the United States were willing to find infringe-
ment based on confusion, since “an Internet user is likely to  
assume that ‘.com’ after a corporation’s name will bring her to that  
corporation’s home page.”78 Importantly, the judge in Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America Inc. v. Bucci found that Section 
1114 of the Lanham Act did not require that the infringement take 
place in the course of the defendant’s “commercial activity,” and 
that liability could be triggered by the potential challenge to users in 
finding the correct website: “Prospective users of plaintiff’s services 
who mistakenly access defendant’s website may fail to continue to 
search for plaintiff’s own home page, due to anger, frustration, or 
the belief that plaintiff’s home page does not exist.”79 
Despite these cases, which scholars have pointed to as examples 
of the system working as intended to correct the problem,80 the  
U.S. government amended the Lanham Act in 1999 to include the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”),81 which 
prohibits “the act of registering with the bad faith intent to profit, a 
domain name that is confusingly similar to a registered or unregis-
tered mark or dilutive of a famous mark,” as well as “squatting” on 
a personal name. However, the ACPA also provides defenses for 
defendants to assert their own fair use rights to use the protected 
mark including for “identifying and parodying, criticizing, or  
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services 
of the famous mark owner.”82 Furthermore, the ACPA includes  
 
76 See McCarthy, supra note 53, at 724–25.  
77 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316. 
78 Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97-0629, 1997 WL 133313, at 
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997). This case is interesting in retrospect, given the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra supporting the 
First Amendment rights of “crisis pregnancy centers,” which deliberately masquerade as 
abortion clinics to talk women out of having the procedure. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018). 
79 Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *4. 
80 See Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name 
System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 155 (2000). 
81 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012). 
82 Id. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
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a requirement for bad faith intent, which can be demonstrated  
according to the following factors: 
(i) the trademark or other intellectual property rights 
of the person, if any, in the domain name; 
(ii) the extent to which the domain name consists of 
the legal name of the person or a name that is 
otherwise commonly used to identify that person; 
(iii) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name 
in connection with the bona fide offering of any 
goods or services; 
(iv) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use 
of the mark in a site accessible under the domain 
name; 
(v) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the 
mark owner’s online location to a site accessible 
under the domain name that could harm the 
goodwill represented by the mark, either for 
commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or 
disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of 
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, 
affiliation, or endorsement of the site; 
(vi) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise 
assign the domain name to the mark owner or any 
third party for financial gain without having 
used, or having an intent to use, the domain name 
in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, 
or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern 
of such conduct; 
(vii) the person’s provision of material and misleading 
false contact information when applying for the 
registration of the domain name, the person’s 
intentional failure to maintain accurate contact 
information, or the person’s prior conduct 
indicating a pattern of such conduct; 
(viii) the person’s registration or acquisition of 
multiple domain names which the person knows 
are identical or confusingly similar to marks of 
others that are distinctive at the time of 
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registration of such domain names, or dilutive of 
famous marks of others that are famous at the 
time of registration of such domain names, 
without regard to the goods or services of the 
parties; and 
(ix) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the 
person’s domain name registration is or is not 
distinctive and famous within the meaning of 
subsection (c).83 
B. Developing the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy 
Under Network Solutions Inc.’s early management of the DNS, 
its dispute resolution policies were primarily focused on protecting 
the company from liability.84 When its first formal dispute resolu-
tion policy was released in 1995, it required an exact match to a  
registered trademark.85 Defendants could defend themselves by 
showing that they had their own registered trademark, and if they 
were unable to do so, they would be offered an alternative domain. 
If the registrants refused this, the domain would be placed on hold, 
meaning neither party would be allowed to use it.86 
In 1998, NTIA, an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
that oversaw the domain name space, began calling for trademark 
enforcement policies to be improved.87 However, in response to 
fears that this process would lead to an imposition of U.S. trademark 
law over the global internet, the NTIA committed to having the  
process be led by WIPO.88 
 
83 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). 
84 Kevin Eng, Breaking Through the Looking Glass: An Analysis of Trademark Rights 
in Domain Names Across Top Level Domains, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 163, 184–87 
(2000). 
85 G. Peter Albert, Eminent Domain Names: The Struggle to Gain Control of the Internet 
Domain Name System, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 781, 787 (1998). 
86 Id. at 788. 
87 See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses,  
63 Fed. Reg. 8826 (proposed Feb. 20, 1998) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 23), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/federal-register-notice/1998/improvement-technical-
management-internet-names-and-addresses-proposed- [http://perma.cc/R3KU-3JDD]. 
88 Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness 
in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 903, 916 (2002). 
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WIPO began a process of public consultation in July 1998,  
issuing a final report in April 1999.89 Although WIPO’s role had 
been established as a way to move the process outside of American 
dominance, it was criticized by more technically focused academics 
and civil society voices for viewing intellectual property holders—
as opposed to technologists or individual domain name holders—as 
its main constituency.90 The single panelist who had been appointed 
to represent a “civil liberties” position, Michael Froomkin, subse-
quently criticized the process for its lack of a proper voice for the 
rights of website registrants.91 He also claimed that in the process of 
developing recommendations, WIPO acted “more like an advocate 
than consensus builder.”92 
Although it was subject to some revisions by an ICANN  
working group in 1999—including, most notably, the addition of a 
section on the rights and legitimate interests of domain registrants—
the final WIPO report formed the core of what became the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”).93 The Board of Directors of 
ICANN approved the UDRP on October 24, 1999.94 The UDRP is 
effectively imposed on anyone who registers a domain, since its  
applicability is included within domain name registration agree-
ments as a mandatory condition of the accreditation agreement that 
 
89 See generally Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, supra note 
26. 
90 See, e.g., Milton Mueller, ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting Through the 
Debris of ‘Self-Regulation,’ 1 J. POL’Y, REG. & STRATEGY FOR TELECOMM. INFO. & MEDIA 
497, 506 (1999); see also generally Michael Froomkin, A Commentary on WIPO’s  
The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues, WIPO 
PANEL EXPERTS (May 19, 1999), http://personal.law.miami.edu/~amf/commentary.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GNB9-FZVY]. 
91 See generally Michael Froomkin, Semi-Private International Rulemaking: Lessons 
Learned from the WIPO Domain Name Process, in REGULATING THE GLOBAL 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 212 (Christopher T. Marsden ed., 2000). 
92 Id. at 225. 
93 See KONSTANTINOS KOMAITIS, THE CURRENT STATE OF DOMAIN NAME REGULATION 
82–84 (2010). 
94 See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (Oct. 24, 
1999), http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm [http://perma.cc/KS9Z-H42J]. 
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ICANN signs with registrars, which certifies them in their role of 
selling domain names to consumers.95 
C. How the UDRP Works 
A brand owner who wishes to proceed with a UDRP complaint 
must have a trademark that is identical or confusingly similar to a 
registered domain name, and must make the case for why the  
respondent should be considered as having no rights or legitimate 
interests in respect of the domain name, and that the domain name 
has been registered and is being used in bad faith.96 The UDRP  
includes a non-exclusive list of circumstances for determining bad 
faith, including: 
(i) circumstances indicating that you [the 
respondent] have registered or you have acquired 
the domain name primarily for the purpose of 
selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the 
domain name registration to the complainant 
who is the owner of the trademark or service 
mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for 
valuable consideration in excess of your 
documented out-of-pocket costs directly related 
to the domain name; or 
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to 
prevent the owner of the trademark or service 
mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding 
domain name, provided that you have engaged in 
a pattern of such conduct; or 
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily 
for the purpose of disrupting the business of a 
competitor; or 
(iv) by using the domain name, you have 
intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial 
gain, Internet users to your web site or other  
 
95 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement, ICANN 17 (June 27, 2013), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-en 
[http://perma.cc/2WML-PRFW]. 
96 Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN § 3(b)(ix) (Sept. 
28, 2013), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en. 
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on-line location, by creating a likelihood of 
confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the 
source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement 
of your web site or location or of a product or 
service on your web site or location.97 
However, the UDRP also includes a set of non-exclusive factors 
by which registrants may demonstrate their legitimate interest in the 
domain name, including: 
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use 
of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the 
domain name or a name corresponding to the 
domain name in connection with a bona fide 
offering of goods or services; or 
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other 
organization) have been commonly known by the 
domain name, even if you have acquired no 
trademark or service mark rights; or 
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or 
fair use of the domain name, without intent  
for commercial gain to misleadingly divert 
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service 
mark at issue.98 
The UDRP processes themselves are carried out by ICANN-
accredited dispute resolution service providers (“providers”).99 
These providers, which assemble their own teams of arbitrators, 
compete with one another for business from complainants, who bear 
the costs of paying for the process, and are able to select which  
provider to use.100 
 
97 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN § 4(b) (Oct. 24, 1999), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en#4b [https://perma.cc/JX3S-
9E74]. 
98 Id. § 4(c). 
99 Id. § 4(d). 
100 Id. 
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D. The UDRP in Action 
Almost from its inception, opinions on the UDRP’s efficacy and 
fairness differed dramatically. Representatives of the trademark  
industry typically exhorted the system’s successes. For example,  
in September 2000, Masanobu Katoh, a senior trademark lawyer 
with Fujitsu Limited, a Japanese global information technology  
company, and an ICANN board member, said: 
I have extensive experience with both Japanese and 
the U.S. court systems, as well as Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Proceedings. Never, and I mean never, 
have I seen a dispute resolution mechanism work  
so well. In less than a year, over 1,000 arbitrations 
have been initiated under the UDRP. In more than 
two thirds [sic] of those cases, there already have  
a disposition. These cases have been handled 
quickly, inexpensively, and most important of  
all, fairly. Without question, the UDRP is an  
important model for Dispute Resolution in other  
e-Commerce areas.101 
In a paper published in 2002, the Internet Committee of the  
International Trademark Association called the UDRP process  
“an efficient and effective process for resolving domain name  
disputes.”102 More recently, the current (as of September 2019) 
President of ICANN’s IPC, Brian Winterfeldt, called the UDRP  
system “low-cost and efficient” in comparison with traditional  
litigation or arbitration.103 
 
101 Geist, supra note 88, at 904 n.4. 
102 NED BRANTHOVER, INTA INTERNET COMM., UDRP—A SUCCESS STORY: A  
REBUTTAL TO THE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF PROFESSOR MILTON MUELLER IN 
“ROUGH JUSTICE” 1 (2002), http://www.inta.org/advocacy/documents/intaudrpsuccess
contramueller.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9UC-5PZJ]. 
103 Brian J. Winterfeldt & Griffin M. Barnett, Trademark Rights Protection Mechanisms 
in the Domain Name System: Current Landscape and Efforts to Diminish Protection,  
29 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 17, 18 (2017). 
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On the other hand, academic and civil society voices were  
heavily critical of the system as being unbalanced in favor of trade-
mark interests.104 Early statistical analyses of UDRP findings 
showed that the overwhelming majority of cases (around eighty  
percent) were decided in favor of the complainant.105 The UDRP’s 
defenders responded by noting that since the system was designed 
to target clearly abusive cases, a relatively high winning percentage 
by complainants is to be expected.106 However, far more troubling, 
from a procedural fairness perspective, are accusations that the  
system lends itself to forum shopping. A study of UDRP cases arbi-
trated between 1999 and November 1, 2000 found that, of the major 
providers initially accredited by ICANN, WIPO and the National 
Arbitration Forum (subsequently rechristened as the ADR Forum) 
awarded domains to the complainants around eighty-two percent of 
the time, while eResolutions awarded domains to the complainant 
only sixty percent of the time.107 Tellingly, an assessment of market 
share carried out at the same time showed that, from December 1999 
to October 2000, eResolutions’ market share shrunk from ten  
percent of filings to just four percent.108 eResolutions went out of 
business in 2001, accusing WIPO of having created a competitive 
advantage by tilting the system in favor of complainants.109 
An exacerbating factor in having a system which leaves itself 
open to domain shopping is that it incentivizes providers to develop 
a reputation for deciding cases in favor of complainants.110 Michael 
Geist, writing in 2001, noted that press releases from the National 
Arbitration Forum took on a “distinctly pro-complainant tone,”  
including titles such as “Arbitrator Delivers Internet Order for  
 
104 See generally Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: A Statistical Assessment of ICANN’s 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 17 INFO. SOC’Y 151 (2001). 
105 Id. at 156. 
106 BRANTHOVER, supra note 102, at 6. 
107 Mueller, supra note 104, at 157. 
108 Id. at 159. 
109 Kieren McCarthy, eResolution Quits Domain Arbitration, REGISTER (Dec. 4,  
2001, 4:31 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/12/04/eresolution_quits_domain_
arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/94BX-6PYJ]. 
110 KOMAITIS, supra note 93, at 97 (citing Michael Froomkin & David Post, Letter to the 
ICANN Board, ICANN WATCH (Jan. 26, 2000), http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/post_
froomkin_udrp_letter.htm [https://perma.cc/GXJ5-VLHG]). 
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Fingerhut,” “May the Registrant of magiceightball.com Keep the 
Domain . . . Not Likely,” “Kevin Spacey Prevails Against Usual 
Suspect in Domain Name Case,” and “Skateboard Magazine 
Thrashes Spanish Double.”111 
The UDRP system also faced criticism for a lack of transparency 
since decisions were published but party submissions are not.112 
Without access to submissions, observers faced great difficulty in 
determining whether cases were being reasonably decided. As a  
result, while an overall analysis of whether or not the system has 
been fair to registrants is difficult to carry out, observers were quick 
to notice complaints that would have been unlikely to succeed in a 
judicial proceeding but nevertheless did succeed under the UDPR. 
One notable early example was the case of crew.com, which was 
successfully challenged by the clothier J. Crew, despite the fact that 
the word is clearly generic, and there was no evidence of any attempt 
to divert users, exploit confusion, or sell the name onwards to the 
brand owner, in line with the enumerated signs of bad faith.113  
However, the panel in this case pushed the onus onto the respondent, 
finding that he had “failed to show demonstrable evidence of plans 
to use the domain name in good faith” since they had “no specific 
use in mind at the time of registration or acquisition,” and that their 
registration of the domain name absent a demonstrable good faith 
use was constructively held to be a bad faith use since their action 
“precludes others who have a legitimate desire to use the name from 
doing so.”114 Notably, the registrant in this case was a re-seller of 
domain names.115 
 
111 Geist, supra note 88, at 907–08 & 908 nn.22–24. 
112 Orna Rabinovich-Einy, The Legitimacy Crisis and the Future of Courts, 17 CARDOZO 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 23, 54 (2015). 
113 See Mueller, supra note 104, at 154. 
114 J. Crew Int’l, Inc. v. crew.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0054 (Apr. 20, 2000), 
available at www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0054.html 
[https://perma.cc/9WUA-6XJY]. 
115 Id. The WIPO decision refers to the registrant as a “speculator,” though within their 
industry they are generally referred to as “domain name investors” or simply “domainers,” 
and are a widely recognized part of the domain name ecosystem. Id. For more information 
about this industry, see generally James Dorman, The Beginner’s Guide to Domain Name 
Investing, MEDIUM (Jan. 14, 2017), https://medium.com/@james.dorman/the-beginners-
guide-to-domain-name-investing-c7ebcec27547 [https://perma.cc/7VH2-Z55S]. 
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Although one may argue, as a majority of the panel did, that the 
registration of domains for the purpose of resale is bad for the  
domain name industry, or for freedom of expression or commerce 
online,116 none of these interests are related to the purpose of the 
UDRP as a trademark enforcement mechanism. This argument  
also fails to explain why the domain, even if it was improperly  
registered, should be transferred over to a company whose trade-
mark bears a vague similarity to it, as opposed to leaving it available 
for registration by Crew (the maker of athletic equipment),117  
Crew (the maker of cleaning or polishing products),118 Crew (the 
award program for diesel engines),119 Crew (the rental service for  
apartments, cabins, and houseboats),120 or Crew (the spyware 
maker).121 In effect, the panel’s interpretation of the UDRP Policy 
legitimizes a new form of cybersquatting, whereby brand owners 
can claim generic spaces that are vaguely similar to their protected 
marks and thus make those spaces inaccessible to other actors for  
legitimate uses. 
While the crew.com case attracted particular scrutiny from  
academics and civil society observers, it was not an isolated incident 
of panelists seeking to expand the applicability of the rules beyond 
their plain language interpretation, or beyond what might fall within 
the boundaries of traditional trademark enforcement. There have 
been other examples of generic word registrations being transferred, 
where the only evidence of “bad faith” was the fact that they were 
not being utilized, including for current.com,122 jt.com,123 
 
116 J. Crew Int’l, Inc. v. crew.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0054 (Apr. 20, 2000). 
117 CREW, Registration No. TMA582054 (Can.). 
118 CREW, Registration No. TMA139145 (Can.). 
119 CREW, Registration No. TMA645144 (Can.). 
120 CREW, Registration No. TMA972749 (Can.). 
121 CREW, Registration No. TMA919049 (Can.). 
122 Current USA, Inc. vs. Current Event, ADR Case No. FA94300 (Apr. 17, 2000), 
available at http://www.adrforum.com/domaindecisions/94300.htm [https://perma.cc/
686E-A8YX]. 
123 Japan Tobacco Inc. v. Yoshiki Okada, WIPO Case No. D2000-0492 (July 24, 2000), 
available at www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0492.html 
[https://perma.cc/X5LM-J3AW]. 
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rant.com,124 and tonsil.com.125 In the last case, it is worth noting that 
the panel found other factors as contributing to their finding of bad 
faith registration, including opaque registration information, and  
the fact that the registrant had a “high degree of knowledge and  
sophistication about internet domain name registration,” though 
none of the factors that they list correspond to those included in  
Section 4(b) of the UDRP Policy.126 Prominent trademark attorneys 
have contributed to this expansive view of what can constitute “bad 
faith.” In a 2017 article, Brian Winterfeldt described the circum-
stances for establishing bad faith as including “passively holding the 
domain name for an extended period of time without making any 
legitimate use of the domain.”127 
One particularly egregious example of the abuse of the UDRP  
is the dispute over rollerblade.net.128 Although the word is still a 
registered mark, there is a strong case to be made that it has become 
genericized.129 The registrant in this case had registered the domain 
name “for [his] nephew’s birthday so he and his friends could  
have a ‘neat’ email address and a website to show off their ‘roller-
blading.’”130 He had made no attempt to sell the domain on to  
the mark owner, and had no pattern of registering domain names  
for resale.131 Instead, he had been using the site to host pictures  
of family members roller-skating when the company demanded  
the domain: 
If Rollerblade the company would have approached 
me with the intent of coming to some kind of mutual 
agreement I would have let them have the site in  
 
124 Rant, LLC v. Long, WIPO Case No. D2000-0946, (Oct. 10, 2000), available at 
https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0946.html 
[https://perma.cc/23Q2-FCCP]. 
125 Süd-Chemie AG v. tonsil.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0376, (July 3, 2000), 
available at https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0376.html 
[https://perma.cc/DFM8-7NN4]. 
126 Id. 
127 Winterfeldt & Barnett, supra note 103, at 18. 
128 Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady, WIPO Case No. D2000-0429, (June 25, 2000), 
available at https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0429.html 
[https://perma.cc/72WC-KAFG]. 
129 See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 33, at 48. 
130 See Rollerblade, WIPO Case No. D2000-0429. 
131 Id. 
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exchange for an item out of their product line and a 
tee-shirt for my nephew. Instead, the first communi-
cation I got from Rollerblade the company was a 
threat that I was going to have to pay a bunch of 
money for their legal fees to sue me for reserving the 
name. I now have no intentions of relinquishing my 
domain name ROLLERBLADE.NET.132 
Somewhat incredibly, the panel found this statement to be indicative 
that the registrant was “determined to exploit his nuisance value . . . 
to be bought off.”133 They ordered the domain transferred, finding 
that there was not “the slightest indication of a legitimate trademark 
interest” from the registrant, and that the fact that the registrant had 
constructive knowledge of the trademark was sufficient to find that 
it had been registered in bad faith.134 The panel’s language equating 
“no legitimate trademark interest” with having “no legitimate right 
or interest” is telling, as it seems to preclude any legitimate non-
brand-owner uses of the word “rollerblade.”135 
Another problematic trend has been UDRP panelists ordering 
domain names transferred that are explicitly derogatory of a  
registered mark. For example, in 2017, a panelist ordered the trans-
fer of the domain name “marlborosucks.com.”136 Both the registrant 
and the brand owner were located in the United States, and the  
registrant cited relevant U.S. case law that dismissed infringement, 
cybersquatting, and dilution actions against websites featuring  
protected trademarks, which were being used to criticize those  
companies’ business practices.137 The panelist distinguished these 
cases by pointing to the fact that no website had yet been set up at 
the address, once again taking the position that, if a domain name 
 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Computer Services, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2017-0847, 
(June 15, 2017), available at https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/text.jsp?case=
D2017-0847 [https://perma.cc/BP7H-STUX]. 
137 See id. (citing Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005); Lucas 
Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2004); TMI, Inc. v. 
Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004); Cleary Bldg. Corp. v. David A. Dame, Inc., 674 F. 
Supp. 2d 1257 (D. Colo. 2009)). 
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was in the same neighborhood as a registered mark, the burden 
shifted to the registrant to demonstrate a non-infringing use. 
While the majority of cases involving domains that are overtly 
critical of protected marks have been resolved in favor of the brand 
owner, this position has not been universal. In 2000, a panelist  
refused to order the transfer of ihatebridgestone.com, ihatefire-
stone.com, and bridgestonesucks.com, after all three had been  
registered by a disgruntled former employee, who had been engaged 
in a dispute with the company over pension payments.138 While a 
complaint against walmartblows.com was upheld,139 another com-
plaint against boycottwalmart.com was denied, even though the  
registrant failed to mount any defense, with the panelist noting that: 
[M]embers of the public wishing to find a website  
associated with the Complainant [Walmart] would 
not be confused as to whether the Complainant 
owned or operated the website at ‘www.boycott-
walmart.com.’ It would be perfectly clear to anyone 
who recognized the Complainant’s trademarks that 
the disputed domain name would not resolve to a site 
used by the Complainant to promote its own goods 
or services.140  
In America Online, Inc. v. Johuathan Investments, Inc., in a dispute 
over the domain name fucknetscape.com, the panelist stated their 
position even more emphatically, finding that it was “manifestly,  
on its face, a name which can have nothing whatever to do with the 
Complainant. It is a name which, by its very nature, declares  
 
138 Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, WIPO Case No. D2000-0190, (July 6, 2000), 
available at https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html 
[https://perma.cc/7VM6-5F2L]. 
139 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. xc2, WIPO Case No. D2006-0811, (Aug. 29, 2006), 
available at https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0811.html 
[https://perma.cc/3TAL-YXFK]. 
140 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Traffic Yoon, WIPO Case No. D2006-0812, (Sept. 20, 2006), 
available at https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0812.html 
[https://perma.cc/CMP5-UJSQ]. 
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that it is hostile to Netscape,” and that the potential for confusion  
was “inconceivable.”141 
Intuitively, one would assume that this sentiment should be true 
for any of the “-sucks” domain names. It is beyond credibility  
to suggest that even the most unsophisticated consumer would  
navigate to “marlborosucks.com” in the expectation of finding the 
official company page. At this point, though, we are clearly far  
beyond any traditional understanding of the role of trademark, in 
terms of preventing customer confusion, or allowing a producer to 
distinguish their products. Indeed, we have even moved beyond  
a dilution or tarnishment doctrine, where enforcement is used to  
prevent unfair degrading of a mark, or attempts to unjustly freeload 
off of the goodwill accumulated by a well-known brand. Instead, 
brand owners are employing trademark enforcement in the domain 
name space as an offensive strategy to ensure that they retain total 
control over not just the word itself, but also any words or phrases 
that even sound similar. With this strategy, brand owners seek to 
stifle not just misuses of their mark, but also legitimate criticism of 
their companies. As the next section demonstrates, these expansive 
uses have become even further entrenched with the new generation 
of rights protection mechanisms. 
IV. THE NEXT GENERATION OF RIGHTS PROTECTION MECHANISMS 
A. The gTLD Expansion 
When ICANN was first created, there were seven top-level  
domains available: .com (for commercial businesses), .edu (for  
educational institutions), .int (for intergovernmental and treaty  
organizations), .gov (for U.S. government entities), .mil (for the 
U.S. Department of Defense), .org (for non-profit organizations), 
and .net (for general umbrellas sites).142 However, as early as 1995, 
 
141 America Online, Inc. v. Johuathan Investments, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0918, 
(Sept. 14, 2001), available at https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2001/
d2001-0918.html [https://perma.cc/F524-PVC9]. 
142 Daniela Michele Spencer, Much Ado About Nothing: ICANN’s New GTLDs, 29 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 870 (2014). An eighth top-level domain, .arpa, was also used 
for administrative purposes. Id. 
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the head of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority was discussing 
the creation of new gTLDs, and these proposals were revisited after 
ICANN was created, with the launch of seven new gTLDs between 
2001 and 2004: .biz, .info, .museum, .name, .coop, .pro, and .aero.143 
Shortly after this, ICANN began discussing the idea of opening 
up the gTLD space more broadly for new proposals, effectively  
allowing potential registry operators to submit applications for the 
creation of as many new gTLDs as the market might support. On  
the one hand, this presented an opportunity for the brand industry,  
insofar as it allowed new explicitly branded top-level domains,  
such as .target, .nike, and .bananarepublic.144 However, trademark 
interests at ICANN, as concentrated in the IPC, expressed vocal  
opposition to a wide expansion of the gTLD system, fearing that  
the new real estate would make trademark enforcement more  
difficult.145 This view was echoed by the International Trademark 
Association, which maintains a close relationship with the IPC.146 
Since the UDRP was first established, it has remained an active 
venue for resolving conflicts over domain names connected to trade-
marks.147 It is easy to understand why the trademark protection  
industry might be alarmed by the concept of the domain space  
expanding to include a virtually unlimited number of new domains, 
 
143 Id. 
144 See Andrew Allemann, Will .Amazon Ever See the Light of Day? There’s Some 
Movement, DOMAIN NAME WIRE (Sept. 19, 2018), https://domainnamewire.com/2018/09/
19/dot-amazon-domain/ [https://perma.cc/257P-REW5]. A particularly heated argument 
ensued after the retail company Amazon applied to register .amazon, a move that was 
vociferously opposed by the nations of Brazil and Peru, who claimed the gTLD for 
themselves, essentially pitting ICANN’s business stakeholders against its governmental 
stakeholders. As of November 2018, the matter still has not been fully resolved. See id. 
145 ICANN INTELL. PROP. CONSTITUENCY, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONSTITUENCY 
IMPACT STATEMENT REGARDING THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW GTLDS 1 (2007), available at 
https://www.ipconstituency.org/assets/ipc-position-papers/2007/IPC%20Impact%20
Statement%20re%20new%20gTLDs.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS28-RXUJ]. 
146 Jacqueline D. Lipton & Mary Wong, Trademarks and Freedom of Expression in 
ICANN’s New gTLD Process, 38 MONASH U. L. REV. 188, 197 (2012). 
147 Total Number of Cases Per Year, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/
amc/en/domains/statistics/cases.jsp [https://perma.cc/ZR25-4MVM]. There was a period 
of decline from 2001–2003, though this can be explained as a result of the initial flood of 
cases that were filed when the system was first established. Id. 
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as they might be faced with having to file thousands of new “defen-
sive” registrations to retain exclusivity over their marks. Of course, 
it is important to note that the level of “exclusivity” to which trade-
mark owners are entitled varies enormously based on jurisdictional 
and contextual factors. One of Canada’s leading cases on trademark 
law, which found no infringement in a chain of “Barbie” branded 
restaurants, is a good example of this.148 Indeed, one of the selling 
points of the gTLD expansion was that it might allow an opportunity 
for companies that had missed out on a .com domain to find an  
alternative that matched their brand. So, rather than having every 
company compete over delta.com, Delta Airlines could exist at 
delta.fly, Delta Hotels at delta.hotel, Delta Bank at delta.bank, etc. 
B. From Cybersquatting to Typosquatting   
Wariness on the part of trademark interests towards the gTLD 
expansion was compounded by a shift in the dynamic that brand 
owners faced in seeking to protect their image online, as traditional 
cybersquatting gave way to broader challenges. Where early cyber-
squatters like Dennis Toeppen benefitted from an ignorance among 
many established businesses of the commercial possibilities of the 
internet, following the dot-com bubble at the end of the 1990’s, 
those days were over. By explicitly including attempts to sell a do-
main to the brand owner at an inflated price as evidence of bad faith, 
the UDRP significantly limited the financial viability of the business 
model which Toeppen and his ilk had followed. 
Instead, new challenges arose in the form of “typosquatting,” 
where a slight variation of a common or famous trademark (e.g., 
“Facbook.com”) would be registered with the intention of catching 
users who made a spelling or typing error in their browser.149  
These sites would often be used for clickfarming, hosting banner 
advertisements and collecting revenues as a result of users who  
mistakenly navigated to them and clicked on these ads, and some-
times for more overt forms of passing off, such as by imitating the 
 
148 Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 722, 820 (Can.). 
149 Jacqueline D. Lipton, Bad Faith in Cyberspace: Grounding Domain Name Theory in 
Trademark, Property, and Restitution, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 447, 474 (2010). 
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intended website but providing links to competing products.150 
However, more nefariously, in some instances these sites are used 
to distribute malware, or support phishing, spamming, and online 
fraud.151 In comparison to traditional cybersquatting, which relied 
on registering a domain that exactly matched an existing trademark, 
these domains were more disposable, since they were planted on 
common misspellings, of which there is a virtually endless supply. 
This allows them to be set up in bulk, compounding the challenge 
facing trademark holders in seeking to protect the exclusivity of 
their brand. 
As part of the negotiations for approving the gTLD expansion  
in ICANN’s multi-stakeholder policymaking process, ICANN  
instituted a set of new rights protection mechanisms that would  
apply to the new top-level domains, notably including the Uniform 
Rapid Suspension (“URS”) and the Trademark Clearinghouse, the  
latter of which is used to support the sunrise registration period and 
the trademark claims period.152 
C. The Uniform Rapid Suspension 
The URS is a “rights protection mechanism” that was designed 
to complement the existing UDRP by offering a streamlined “path 
to relief for rights holders experiencing the most clear-cut cases of 
[trademark] infringement.”153 This is achieved by substantially 
stripping down the procedure attached to the UDRP, including 
quicker timelines.154 However, rather than a transfer of the domain 
over to the mark holder, as is required by the UDRP, the URS merely 
 
150 Paul Ducklin, Typosquatting—What Happens When You Mistype a Website Name?, 
NAKED SECURITY, https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/typosquatting/ [https://perma.cc/
5EHM-C5RU]. 
151 Id. It is unclear as to whether these activities are more prevalent in new gTLDs than 
in the traditional TLDs. 
152 ICANN, TRADEMARK CLEARINGHOUSE 1, § 1.2 (June 4, 2012), http://newgtlds.icann.
org/en/applicants/agb/trademark-clearinghouse-04jun12-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C6G-
UHQ8] [hereinafter ICANN, TRADEMARK CLEARINGHOUSE]. 
153 Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS), ICANN (May 17, 2018), https://www.icann.org/
resources/pages/urs-2014-01-09-en [https://perma.cc/T8D7-XZ2W]. 
154 5 Things Every Domain Name Registrant (That’s You!) Should Know About ICANN’s 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) and Uniform Rapid Suspension 
(URS) System, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/5-things-registrants-know-
udrp-urs-2019-09-25-en [https://perma.cc/7B23-GNCK]. 
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allows for the domain to be suspended for the duration of its  
registration term. In other words, while it is not an effective avenue 
for a brand owner to target a domain that it wants to obtain for itself, 
as was the case with crew.com, the URS can be useful in dealing 
with “typosquatting,” where the sites are less valuable. 
The URS is also substantially quicker than the UDRP, with  
processes that typically only last fourteen days from filing to  
determination, and typically start at less than $400,155 as opposed  
to UDRP actions, which cost at least $1,500 with WIPO, the largest 
provider.156 Like the UDRP, URS claims are adjudicated by  
accredited dispute resolution service providers, of which there are 
three, as of November 2018: the Asian Domain Name Dispute  
Resolution Centre (“ADNDRC”), ADR Forum, and MFSD.157 
The URS standards for bad faith are largely identical to  
those found in the UDRP.158 However, the URS has broader consid-
erations for legitimate use, in recognition of the idea that it is meant 
to be used only for extremely clear-cut cases.159 It also specifically 
says that trading in domain names for profit, holding a large  
portfolio of domain names, and sale of traffic (such as through  
click-per-view revenue) are not, in and of themselves, indicia of  
bad faith.160 
Although the URS does not represent a further expansion of the 
scope of trademark protection, the existence of this “streamlined” 
procedure for enforcing trademark claims in the domain name space 
raises additional concerns nonetheless. As discussed in the previous 
section, the scope of protection offered by the UDRP goes far  
 
155 See, e.g., Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS), ASIAN DOMAIN NAME DISP. RESOL. CTR., 
https://www.adndrc.org/urs [https://perma.cc/V9D5-HTYL] (showing the fee schedule of 
the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Center). 
156 Schedule of Fees Under the UDRP, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Dec. 1, 2002), 
https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/fees/ [https://perma.cc/FE2C-CDUJ]. It is also 
worth noting that UDRP fees scale up substantially where multiple panelists or multiple 
domain names are involved whereas they remain much flatter for the URS. Id.  
157 Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS), supra note 153. 
158 ICANN, UNIFORM RAPID SUSPENSION SYSTEM (“URS”), § 1.2.6 (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/urs/procedure-01mar13-en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9YMK-QY89]. 
159 Id. § 5.8. 
160 Id. § 5.9. 
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beyond the trademark protections available under the ACPA or  
in comparable EU law, to say nothing of how it compares with trade-
mark law in countries like Canada, which follow a narrower  
interpretation of tarnishment. While the URS, by demanding a 
stronger standard of evidence for a finding of bad faith, is a small 
step back from the version of trademark rights established under the 
UDRP, it achieves this more demanding evidentiary standard by 
stripping out core procedural protections.161 Thus, while defendants 
have an easier burden of proof, they have less space to operate.162 
A case review carried out by Rebecca Tushnet of Harvard  
University, which was distributed to the ICANN Rights Protection 
Mechanism Working Group, found that suspensions were granted  
in the vast majority of cases (ninety-two percent).163 Registrants  
defending against URS claims defaulted around seventy-four  
percent of the time, presenting no defense to the claim.164 However, 
supporters of the URS could offer two responses to these statistics. 
Firstly, they could posit that a high rate of affirmative findings is the 
natural result of a system designed to only address clear cut cases of 
infringement. Secondly, they could argue that given the disposable 
nature of clickfarming sites, and considering that it is relatively easy 
to register a dozen new slight misspellings of well-known brands, 
the disinclination of proprietors to mount efforts to defend these 
claims is not surprising.165 
 
161 Id. §§ 1.2.6.2, 1.2.6.3, 8.2, 8.5. 
162 Id. §§ 1.2.6.2, 1.2.6.3, 8.2, 8.5. The URS rules provide the registrant with only 
fourteen calendar days to provide a response. Id. § 5.1. URS processes also do not allow 
respondents the possibility of opting for a three-member panel, rather than a single 
adjudicator. Id. § 7.1. 
163 Rebecca Tushnet, 2018-05-30 Review of all Rights Protection Mechanisms (RPMs) 
in All gTLDs PDP WG, ICANN (May 30, 2018), https://community.icann.org/display/
RARPMRIAGPWG/2018-05-30+Review+of+all+Rights+Protection+Mechanisms+%28
RPMs%29+in+all+gTLDs+PDP+WG [https://perma.cc/3TLG-BFHD] (follow Dropbox 
URL under Step 2 of the “Proposed Agenda”; then click on the “Summary Tables” tab of 
the spreadsheet; the percentage of suspensions was calculated by dividing the total 
suspensions, 727, into 787, the total number of cases (833) less the withdrawn cases (46)). 
164 Id. (The percentage of defaults was obtained by dividing the number of defaults, 581, 
into 787, the total number of cases (833) less the withdrawn cases (46).).  
165 See, e.g., E-mail from Georges Nahitchevansky to Nat Cohen, [GNSO-RPM-WG] 
[gnso-rpm-wg] ‘Lack of Cause of Action’ Followup (URS Proposals #18, #19, #20), 
ICANN (Oct. 12, 2018, 3:22 PM UTC), https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-rpm-wg/
2018-October/003404.html [https://perma.cc/9JNJ-4TPF]. 
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A more troubling finding from Professor Tushnet’s research is 
that, of 787 cases examined, adjudicators in 105 of them (thirteen 
percent) provided no evidence or rationale whatsoever in their writ-
ten decision: they merely certified that the URS standard had been 
met, with no further explanation.166 Moreover, an ICANN working 
group looking into the implementation of the URS discovered that 
ADNDRC, one of the three certified adjudication providers, had 
procedures in place which failed to fulfil the requirements spelled 
out in the URS rules.167 
This Article’s scope does not extend to evaluating whether URS 
procedures as applied meet an appropriate standard for procedural 
fairness in stripping a registrant of their property.168 However, in 
considering the URS’ function as a quicker, cheaper, and easier 
mechanism for enforcement than the UDRP, it is important to bear 
in mind that the UDRP itself was designed to be a quicker, cheaper, 
and easier enforcement mechanism than traditional judicial reme-
dies. Moreover, every indication from representatives of the trade-
mark industry, from INTA to the current head of the IPC at ICANN, 
is that it has in fact served this function well.169 In this context,  
the continued paring down of procedural protections for website 
registrants facing trademark claims is troubling. However, as the 
next section indicates, a much more significant expansion in the  
applicability of trademark rules to the online space occurred with 
the creation of the Trademark Clearinghouse. 
 
166 Tushnet, supra note 163.  
167 Follow-up on Action Items for Providers Sub Team, ICANN (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/93127038/Follow-up%20on%20
Action%20Items%20for%20Providers%20Sub%20Team_%2822%20Aug%202018%29.
pdf?version=3&modificationDate=1535467639000&api=v2 [https://perma.cc/5E4D-
QEDL]. 
168 Tucows.Com Co. v. Lojas Renner SA, 2011 ONCA 548 ¶ 66 (Can.) (ruling in the 
affirmative on the question of whether domain names actually constitute “property”). There 
are also differences of opinion as to this question. Id. ¶ 45. Other jurisdictions have viewed 
the matter differently. Id. 
169 See Winterfeldt & Barnett, supra note 103, at 18; see also BRANTHOVER, supra note 
102, at 1. 
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D. The Trademark Clearinghouse, Sunrise Registrations, and 
Trademark Claims Services 
In addition to the URS, the other major change to ICANN’s 
trademark enforcement mechanisms which accompanied the  
expansion of the top-level domain space was the creation of the 
Trademark Clearinghouse. The Trademark Clearinghouse is a  
centralized repository of recognized marks to which brand owners 
may submit any mark that is nationally or regionally registered, has 
been validated through a court of law or other judicial proceeding, 
or is protected by a statute or treaty in effect at the time the infor-
mation is submitted.170 The Trademark Clearinghouse may also  
accept any other “marks that constitute intellectual property.”171 As 
of November 2018, there were over 44,574 registered trademarks 
that had been accepted by the Trademark Clearinghouse.172 
The main function of the Trademark Clearinghouse is to facili-
tate Sunrise registrations and the Trademark Claims service.173  
The Sunrise is a mandatory thirty-day period that all new top-level 
domains are required to provide to owners of trademarks, whereby 
any owner of a mark that is recorded in the Trademark Clearing-
house may pay a special fee to the registry to register a domain 
matching their mark before it is opened for general sale.174 So, for 
example, before domains in the top-level domain .blog were opened 
for public registrations in 2016, the company that operates the  
registry, Automattic, was required to allow any company that has a 
mark registered in the Trademark Clearinghouse to register the  
domain corresponding to this mark in advance.175 This ensures that 
a company like Apple will not have to deal with any other party 
using apple.blog to clickfarm, route to a fake Apple ID login page, 
or sell knockoff Apple products. However, this system also prevents 
 
170 ICANN, TRADEMARK CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 152, § 3.2. 
171 Id. § 3.2.4. 
172 TMCH Stats November 2018, TRADEMARK CLEARINGHOUSE (Nov. 7, 2018), 
http://www.trademark-clearinghouse.com/content/tmch-stats-november-2018 
[https://perma.cc/KE7S-XR3R]. 
173 ICANN, TRADEMARK CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 152. 
174 Id. § 6.2. 
175 Sunrise Period for .Blog Set to Open, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://www.worldipreview.com/news/sunrise-period-for-blog-set-to-open-12048 
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any of the myriad other perfectly legitimate uses that potential  
registrants might have had in mind for apple.blog, as a common  
and generic word. One could imagine websites hosting recipes,  
gardening tips, stories about New York, reviews of Apple products, 
or any number of other perfectly legitimate uses for that domain 
name. Instead, as of October 2019, apple.blog merely routes to the 
company’s official Newsroom.176 
Some registries have rules which mandate that only relevant 
businesses can reserve domains. For example, .pharmacy is run by 
the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, which includes 
vetting procedures for their applicants.177 However, these registries 
are the exception rather than the norm. The rules that allow  
trademark owners an inside track to protect domains related to their 
mark make no such categorical distinction.178 In other words, Apple 
can use its status in the Trademark Clearinghouse to register  
domains completely unrelated to its actual business, such as  
for apple.clothing, or even apple.food. Although the company  
originally registered the mark for the sale of computer products (an 
arbitrary use of this common word),179 the Trademark Clearing-
house makes no such categorical distinction, allowing the company 
to expand its scope of protection into areas where the word would 
be considered generic. 
The Trademark Clearinghouse has also bolstered companies’ 
ability to use trademark enforcement as an avenue to chill legitimate 
criticism. When the .SUCKS top-level domain was announced in 
2015, the company running the registry, Vox Populi, realized the 
 
176 Newsroom, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/newsroom/?cid=oas-us-domains-apple.
blog [https://perma.cc/A345-BR52] (entering apple.blog into your search engine 
automatically redirects you to the Apple Newsroom). 
177 For more information on how this works, see Program Eligibility and Policies, NAT’L 
ASS’N BOARDS PHARMACY, https://nabp.pharmacy/programs/dotpharmacy/standards 
[https://perma.cc/CZG9-5V9M]. It is also worth noting that .pharmacy has been criticized 
by pharmaceutical websites based in Canada who were denied accreditation, apparently 
due to their cross border sales. See Kevin Murphy, .Pharmacy TLD Faces Action After 
Losing Complaint over Canadian Drug Peddler, DOMAIN INCITE (July 16, 2018), 
http://domainincite.com/23181-pharmacy-tld-faces-action-after-losing-complaint-over-
canadian-drug-peddler [https://perma.cc/7RR9-G7B6]. 
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179 Apple Trademark List*, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-property/
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temptation for brands to lock out critical uses of their domains,  
and announced that it would charge a relatively steep price, USD 
$2,499, for sunrise registrations. Greg Shatan, a trademark lawyer 
who at the time was the head of ICANN’s IPC, complained that the 
entire registry was a “shakedown scheme.”180 ICANN responded  
by requesting that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission consider 
whether Vox Populi’s actions violated U.S. law.181 In response, 
while the Federal Trade Commission declined to cite any specific 
violations of the law, their Chairwoman called on ICANN to  
consider whether even stronger rights protection mechanisms might 
be necessary to address the potential for “consumer confusion,” as 
“the public may not be able to discern the real owner behind a 
.SUCKS site.”182 
In Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., Canada’s Supreme 
Court rejected the “moron in a hurry” test for consumer confusion, 
in favor of the standard of a “casual consumer somewhat in a 
hurry.”183 However, it is difficult to believe that even a moron might 
try and locate Apple’s official website by navigating to apple.sucks. 
Returning to the reasoning in America Online, Inc. v. Johuathan  
Investments, Inc.,184 no reasonable person is likely to go to that  
domain and, finding it filled with caustic complaints about Apple,  
assume that the company was somehow endorsing the space.  
Focusing on Vox Populi’s pricing is a distraction from the fact that 
the entire exercise is predicated on trademark enforcement rights 
 
180 .Sucks Dispute: IPC Backs FTC’s Policy Proposals for ICANN, TRADEMARKS & 
BRANDS ONLINE (June 1, 2015), https://www.trademarksandbrandsonline.com/news/
sucks-dispute-ipc-backs-ftc-s-policy-proposals-for-icann-4387 [https://perma.cc/WCB6-
8NU6]. 
181 A letter was also sent to Canada’s Office for Consumer Affairs, since Vox Populi is 
based in Ottawa, but the government declined to intervene. See Dean Beeby, Dot-Sucks 
Domain Name Not Our Problem, Ottawa Says, CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORP. (Dec. 18, 
2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/dot-sucks-canada-internet-website-
domain-1.3370577 [https://perma.cc/L5V5-UVF8]. 
182 Letter from Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, to John O. Jeffrey, Gen. Counsel  
& Sec’y, ICANN (May 27, 2015), http://pub.bna.com/eclr/FTCsucksresponse.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7TUW-CLGS]. 
183 Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 772, 803 (Can.). 
184 America Online, Inc. v. Johuathan Investments, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0918 
(Sept. 14, 2001), available at https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2001/
d2001-0918.html [https://perma.cc/SQ52-ECMZ]. 
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that have no basis in law. The fact that policy conversations now 
start from the assumption that a trademark owner has the right to 
prevent anyone else from setting up a domain declaring that their 
brand “sucks” is illustrative of just how far down the rabbit hole the 
debate has gone, as compared to trademark’s traditional roots in 
consumer protection. 
The second major function of the Trademark Clearinghouse is 
to facilitate the Trademark Claims service.185 This program, which 
is also mandatory for all of the new top-level domains, provides  
a sixty-day minimum period after public sales commence during 
which time anyone seeking to register a mark that matches one listed 
in the Trademark Clearinghouse will receive a notification that the 
brand owner has asserted rights in the name.186 If the registrant  
opts to proceed, the brand owner will receive a notification of the 
registration.187 Although this service does not actually prevent  
registrants other than the mark holder from obtaining a domain 
name,188 there are concerns as to whether the notifications might 
pose a chilling effect on legitimate registrants.189 These concerns are 
exacerbated by the fact that the Trademark Claims service has been 
augmented by the “Trademark+50” mechanism, which allows brand 
owners to add up to fifty additional letter strings to each record  
they have in the Trademark Clearinghouse, such as common  
misspellings, which have previously been the subject of a successful 
UDRP claim.190 In other words, a person seeking to register “crew” 
in any of the new top-level domains would likely find themselves 
faced with a notification that a brand owner had asserted rights  
in that name. Prominent members of the IPC seem to have  
 
185 ICANN, TRADEMARK CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 152, § 6.1. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. § 6.1.4. 
189 See, e.g., Posting of Paul Keating, paul@law.es, to gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org (June 9, 
2017, 11:34 PM), https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-rpm-wg/2017-June/002085.html 
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190 Trademark Clearinghouse Verification Service Now Accepting Additional Abused 
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acknowledged the chilling effect on legitimate registrations, but 
questioned whether or not it is “intolerable.”191 
Additionally, civil society and academics have raised two  
major concerns regarding the operation of the Trademark Clearing-
house.192 The first is that the Trademark Clearinghouse adopts a 
“lowest bar” approach to registration, whereby if a mark can be  
protected under any jurisdiction, and in any context, it is eligible for 
inclusion globally under a universal standard of protection.193  
For example, the Trademark Clearinghouse accepts geographic  
indicators that may be registered in Europe but not in the United 
States.194 However, of even greater concern is that the Trademark 
Clearinghouse accepts registration of design marks with no regard 
to the contextual features that are fundamental to their protected  
status.195 Although the rules for the Trademark Clearinghouse sug-
gest that only word marks are eligible, because no global metric is 
available to differentiate a word mark from a design mark, Deloitte, 
the company that operates the Trademark Clearinghouse, decided to 
accept any submission where the words were “predominant” and 
“clearly separable or distinguishable from the device element.”196 
In 2017, ICANN’s Rights Protection Mechanism Working 
Group decided to test the scope of what could be registered in  
the Trademark Clearinghouse by sending a list of examples of  
potential marks to Deloitte to inquire as to whether they might be 
accepted and how these registrations would be applied.197 The  
 
191 Winterfeldt & Barnett, supra note 103, at 21. 
192 See Letter from Trademark Scholars to Philip Corwin, J. Scott Evans, & Kathy 
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195 What About Device/Image Marks?, TRADEMARK CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.
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RYB6-YL57]. 
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(Mar. 4, 2017), https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/64066042/Deloitte%
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examples included “Music” by Parallel Music Entertainment, 
“Cars” by Disney, “Parents” by Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publishing 
Co., and “A” by Aisha’s Management & Consulting Group.198 
Deloitte confirmed that all these examples would be approved for 
registration as a word mark under their standards.199 Once a mark 
has been accepted, it is protected as a word mark without reference 
to any distinguishing design features, since domain names are a text-
only medium.200 
The notion of protecting “music” as a word mark, globally,  
including in the field of music production, is an enormous expansion 
of the scope of trademark protection that runs counter to the basic 
balancing that is meant to take place between rewarding established 
players and promoting fair competition. Although the four examples 
listed above are hypothetical, journalists were able to uncover  
a number of generic words that are registered in the Trademark 
Clearinghouse as protected word marks, including: active, auto, 
bank, craft, fire, hotel, internet, luxury, natural, pizza, style, texas, 
and wedding.201 These registrations, which were found through trial 
and error, may be the tip of the iceberg in terms of the number  
of generic or descriptive words that are currently protected. It is  
impossible to find a more accurate measure of how many of the 
marks currently included in the Trademark Clearinghouse are  
generic or descriptive, or whether these marks have been exploited 
to obtain valuable domain names that are unrelated to the brand 
 
198 See id. 
199 See Follow Up Questions for Deloitte from the GNSO’s Review of All Rights 
Protection Mechanisms (RPM) Review Policy Development Process Working Group 4–5 
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owner’s business, due to the second major problem with the  
Trademark Clearinghouse: it is entirely secret.202 
Unlike trademark registries, which are generally open and 
searchable, the Trademark Clearinghouse is kept confidential,  
apart from aggregate numbers that Deloitte publishes.203 This is  
ostensibly to protect the commercial sensitivity of the trademark  
information which the Trademark Clearinghouse contains, despite 
the fact that, as registered trademarks, all of the submissions are  
already publicly available via the domestic databases where they 
have been filed. The argument for secrecy is essentially that  
allowing third parties to see which marks have been registered in the 
Trademark Clearinghouse would grant insight into the companies’ 
prioritization and strategies going forward.204 Again, this argument 
seems difficult to defend, since the public availability of most 
brands’ overall trademark portfolios, and the practical ability to 
query whether an individual word exists in the Trademark Clearing-
house, would seem to make it relatively easy to determine which 
marks a company has chosen to include. Nonetheless, the secrecy  
of the database presents a major obstacle to any form of oversight 
over the operation of the Trademark Clearinghouse, as well as  
limiting the ability of potential new entrants to determine the amount  
of open “real estate” around an online marketing avenue they  
are considering. 
 
202 See Email from Julie Hedlund, Policy Director, ICANN, to PDP Working Group, 
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V. ONGOING DEBATES 
A. ICANN’s Rights Protection Mechanisms Working Group 
In 2016, ICANN established a Policy Development Process 
Working Group to review its rights protection mechanisms, includ-
ing the URS, the UDRP, and the Trademark Clearinghouse.205 As of 
October 2019, its work remains ongoing, under the shared leader-
ship of Brian Beckham, the Head of Internet Dispute Resolution at 
WIPO; Phil Corwin, Policy Counsel at Verisign (previously known 
as Network Solutions Inc.); and Kathy Kleiman, co-founder of 
ICANN’s Non-Commercial Users’ Constituency and a Practitioner-
in-Residence at American University’s Glushko-Samuelson Intel-
lectual Property Law Clinic. 
Over the course of the working group’s discussions, the  
overreaching nature of these mechanisms, and the growing gap  
between trademark enforcement in the domain name space and 
trademark enforcement as it exists under domestic legal frame-
works, have been subject to sustained criticism from civil society 
and academic observers, as well as by domain name investors.206 On 
the other hand, ICANN’s IPC, together with other representatives of  
the trademark industry such as the International Trademark  
Association, have staunchly defended the systems as necessary to 
protect against infringement.207 Indeed, participants from the IPC 
have made a number of proposals to expand enforcement even  
more, including by further stripping down procedural protections  
for defendants in the URS208 and further expanding the scope of  
sunrise registrations.209 
 
205 See generally Charter for Proposed PDP to Review All Rights Protection Mechanisms 
in All gTLDs, ICANN (Mar. 15, 2016), https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/filefield_
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Although ICANN’s consensus-based model of decision-making 
makes it unlikely these proposals will succeed, they similarly make 
it difficult for contrary reform proposals—which aim to pare back 
trademark enforcement—to make any headway.210 The custom that 
the status quo prevails in the absence of consensus creates difficulty 
in pushing back, even where implementation decisions have had  
the effect of expanding trademark protections beyond the limits  
formally agreed to through ICANN’s processes. Such has been the 
case with Deloitte’s decision to begin accepting design marks into 
the Trademark Clearinghouse, which, while seemingly contrary to 
the rules as drafted, is difficult to overturn because of significant 
opposition by the IPC against a major change.211 
B. Private Sector Trademark Protection Initiatives 
In addition to ICANN’s institutional rights protection mecha-
nisms, intellectual property enforcement in the domain name space 
has been further expanded by private sector initiatives. The most 
notable of these is the Domain Protected Marks List (“DPML”)  
that has been implemented by Donuts, the world’s largest registry, 
which owns around 240 different gTLDs.212 The DPML is a paid 
service that allows trademark holders to block registration of any 
domain that matches their mark, or a misspelling of the mark, or  
that contains the protected mark, across all of Donuts’ domains,  
preventing its use by any other party.213 Although, in some  
instances, owners of a different matching trademark that is filed in 
the Trademark Clearinghouse may be able to “unblock” a domain 
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for their own purposes, Donuts is attempting to revise its rules so 
that even these will require the approval of the party that purchased 
the DPML service.214 
Using ICANN’s WHOIS search tool, which flags when domains 
are covered under a DPML Block, examples of generic words that 
are protected under this service, such as “mini” and “discovery,”  
are relatively easy to find.215 In practical terms, the revised rules 
would mean that the companies will have exclusive use over these 
words across Donuts’ 240 different generic top-level domains. This 
is unfortunate for the thousands of other companies that have trade-
marks that contain the words “discovery” or “mini,” and who will 
now find enormous swaths of the domain name space effectively 
blocked from their use. Moreover, the rules will also make it more 
difficult to establish new companies using marks that are similar to 
those in the list. Today’s internet might be a very different place had 
the DPML service existed when Google was founded, assuming that 
any of the companies with a trademark for some variant of “goggles” 
had sought protection. 
As a private company, one could argue that it is up to Donuts to 
decide how much deference to show to trademark holders in seeking 
to control any uses that relate to their protected marks. However, 
there is a key difference between Donuts’ role as a registry and, say, 
a magazine deciding what stories to publish. Donuts has essentially 
been granted a monopoly to register uses of certain sections of the 
domain name space, which is a global public resource. Donuts has 
public interest responsibilities connected to how they carry out this 
function, as is evidenced by the fact that, like all registries, they con-
tract with ICANN, and ICANN has the power to approve particular 
terms in how the registry is governed. Yet, regardless of whether 
one thinks it is within Donuts’ prerogative to offer the DPML  
service, the additional expansion of trademark protection to the 
point where brand owners can control virtually any and all uses of 
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their mark, or words similar to their mark, across huge portions of 
the domain name space, is a major development. 
CONCLUSION 
As early as 2000, academic observers of the domain name space 
warned that that proposed rules to combat cybersquatting could 
eventually result in a system where “ownership of a trademark gives 
one the exclusive right to use the word on the Internet.”216 Given the 
established jurisprudence of the UDRP, as well as the growing role 
of the Trademark Clearinghouse and the Domain Protected Marks 
List, these words are proving prophetic. In retrospect, the fears of an 
imposition of U.S. trademark law over the global internet fell far 
short of the real threat—not that a single country’s rules would  
dominate, but rather that a hybrid model would develop that  
borrowed the most restrictive aspects of each framework without 
adopting the inherent checks, balances, and limitations that have 
evolved alongside these rules. 
The days when a registrant in their basement could defiantly  
extort some of the world’s biggest companies have given way to  
a new kind of cybersquatting. Today, the complainants with the 
sharpest elbows use ICANN’s rights protection mechanisms to  
secure privileged access to valuable areas of the domain name space, 
and powerful and well-resourced brand management firms use 
trademarks as an offensive weapon to close off areas where critical 
speech might take root. Nevertheless, one of the incredible things 
about the internet is its resilience to attack and resistance to  
mechanisms of control. Just as China’s web users have developed 
an elaborate and growing list of euphemisms in order to evade State 
censors,217 people will always find a way to vent their spleen about 
frustrating experiences with companies. Comcast’s early registra-
tion of comcast.sucks may have prevented a caustic sight from 
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emerging on that specific domain,218 but a quick search reveals  
similar sites have been established at fuckyoucomcast.com,  
comcast-sucks.com, and comcastsucksballs.blogspot.com, not to 
mention at least eighteen Twitter accounts219 and nineteen Facebook 
pages220 with titles containing some variation of that phrase. It  
is ironic that, despite the enormous amounts of money, time, and  
energy invested by major brands in lobbying at ICANN for  
exclusivity over their names, their efforts are unlikely to ever make 
a dent in the flow of angry speech directed their way. 
In Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., Canada’s Supreme Court 
cautioned that:  
The economic value of intellectual property rights 
arouses the imagination and litigiousness of rights 
holders in their search for continuing protection of 
what they view as their rightful property. Such a 
search carries with it the risk of discarding basic and 
necessary distinctions between different forms of  
intellectual property and their legal and economic 
functions.221  
This tendency has certainly been on display at ICANN, as trademark 
enforcement has grown, completely divorced from any notions of 
confusion or quality assurance. However, beyond its implications 
for trademark law, the evolution of these enforcement mechanisms 
into broader tools of brand and reputation control is shaping the  
future of the domain name space, as well as the degree to which it 
will be dominated by established commercial interests, at the  
expense of non-commercial voices, or smaller rivals who may be 
denied access to common or generic words in their marketing. The 
careful balance between free competition and fair competition 
which lies at the heart of trademark law has been lost in favor of a 
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maximalist interpretation of the scope of trademark protection that 
goes vastly beyond what might be countenanced in any national  
legal framework. 
By illustrating the extent of the gap that has emerged between 
the traditional function of trademark law, as a mechanism for pro-
moting fair competition, and its current manifestation as an  
aggressive brand protection tool in the domain name space, this  
Article presents a cautionary tale in adapting legal concepts to a  
digital context and highlights the significant potential this approach 
has to lose sight of the original purpose of these rules. This danger 
is particularly acute in instances where significant lobbying or  
business interests are at play. As the commercial sector continues  
to evolve, academics and policymakers should be wary of the  
expansive tendency of trademark rights and of the pressing and  
constant need to ensure that sufficient space remains for innovation 
and new entrants to distinguish themselves in an increasingly 
crowded and aggressively policed linguistic landscape. 
